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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff a.nd Respondent, 
- vs.-
FREDERICK RAY SIBERT, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant in this action was charged with the 
armed robbery of one, Lyle Thomas Butters. The case 
was tried before a jury and a verdict of guilty returned 
by the jury. At the trial, the complaining witness, Lyle 
Thomas Butters, testified regarding the facts surround-
ing the alleged robbery, and after having been cross-
examined by counsel representing the defendant, the 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State offered as a corroborating witness Police Officer 
John J. Ferrin who testified to what the complaining wit-
ness had told him at the time he investigated the alleged 
robbery. This evidence was permitted to be given over 
the objections of counsel (Tr. p. 47-50). The Court then 
admitted in evidence, over counsel's objection, the notes 
'vhich Officer Ferrin had taken regarding the conversa-
tion that he had had with the complaining witness Butters 
(Tr. p. 51). 
On the 9th day of June, 1956, the defendant was sen-
tenced by the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr. The Court 
denied the defendant probation on the ground that he still 
denied his guilt after the verdict of the jury (Tr. p. 121). 
From the verdict of the jury and the judgment en-
tered thereon, and from the sentence of the trial court, 
the appellant appeals. 
POIXT I. 
THE TRIAL COl ... RT ERRED IN AD~IITTING 
THE TESTI:.\£0?\:y OF OFFICER FERRIN 
_A_ND IX .._\D~IITTIXG HIS XOTES I~ EVI-
DJ1~XC~E. 
Th<? State called as its second "·itness at the trial 
of this en8t) Offiet)r John J. Ferrin. The State had Ser-
geant Ft)rriu '8 notes marked as ''Exhibit 1'' and pre-
H(\111 ing tht)nl to St)rgeant Ferrin asked him to testify 
regarding 1 he notes. From these notes Officer Ferrin was 
a llo\\'t\d, over tht) dt)fendant 's objection, to testify to the 
conversation bet\\~Pt)n himself and the "·itness Butters 
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subsequent to the alleged robbery (see Tr. pp. 46-51). 
The testimony of Sergeant Ferrin as to what the wit-
ness Butters told him was in considerable more detail 
than was the testimony of the witness Butters. It included 
a description of the alleged robber, given in some detail, 
a description of his clothing, the color of the car, and the 
license number, and of the conversation that allegedly 
took place between the robber and the witness Butters. 
Apparently, to corroborate the testimony of Ser-
geant Ferrin the State offered notes of Sergeant Ferrin 
which he had used to refresh his recollection regarding 
the heresay testimony just admitted in evidence. Over the 
objection of defendant's counsel the notes of Officer Fer-
rin were admitted in evidence ( Tr. p. 51). It should be 
noted that up until the time that Sergeant Ferrin testi-
fied, the State's entire case rested upon the rather weak 
and unsatisfactory testimony of the witness Butters. 
The somewhat narrow question on appeal is whether 
or not it was proper for the trial judge to permit Officer 
Ferrin to testify to facts that the witness Butters had 
told him occurred, and whether it was improper to admit 
the officer's notes of his conversation with Butters. It 
should be noted that prior to the offering of the testimony 
of Sergeant Ferrin, no witness had been offered to con-
tradict the testimony of the witness Butters. Butters 
had been subjected to cross-examination regarding his 
testimony and regarding inconsistent testimony that he 
had given at the preliminary hearing of the case. The 
State apparently offered Sergeant Ferrin's testimony 
under the theory that the witness Butters had been im-
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peached, and the Ferrin testimony should. be allowed to 
rehabilitate Butters. . 
A minority of jurisdictions have held that where a 
witness is impeached by testimony that he told a different 
story on another occasion than the one that he told under 
oath at the trial, evidence may be offered to show that he 
told a consistent story at a time prior to the alleged incon-
sistent statement. The majority of courts, and certainly 
the better-reasoned decisions, reject this exception to the 
Heresay Rule that some courts have attempted to make, 
and prohibit the admission of heresay testimony to reha-
bilitate a witness even when he has been impeached by the 
positive testimony of anotker witness. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has exam-
ined this problem, and in the case of Ellicott vs. Pe(};rl, 10 
Peters 412, 9 Law Ed., 475, Justice Storey stated the ma-
jority rule, and the reasoning for it: 
""\\:--here 1ritness proof has been offered 
against the testimony of a witness under oath in 
order to impeach his Yeracity establishing that he 
has g-iYen a different account at another time, we 
are of the opinion that in general evidence is not 
admissible in order to confirm his testimony to 
pro,·e that at other times he has given the same 
;1ceount a~ he has under oath; for it is but his mere 
declaration of the fact, and that is not evidence. 
!lis fcstl:nlvuy under oath is better et·idence than 
his coujirn1afory declaration.._'\ not under oath; and 
the repetition of his assertio·ns does 'not carry his 
credibil if .II further, if so far, as his oath. We say, 
in gen(:}ral, because there are exceptions, but they 
n rt• of a peculiar nature not applicable to the cir-
runi~t.nHct}s of the present rase. n (Italics supplied) 
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In the case of Nicholas vs. Stewart, 20 Ala. 358, the 
Court said that when the credibility of a witness is im-
peached by the fact that he has given a different account 
of the transaction from that to which he swears the 
fact that upon another occasion he stated the transac-
tion precisely as he now testifies to it, does not dis-
prove the inconsistency, and to allow inconsistencies in 
the testimony of a witness shown by his sworn testimony 
prevciously given to be removed by his own declara-
tions out of court would be a dangerous departure from 
the rule which requires all evidence to be given under 
the sanction of an oath. 
It would be an unfortunate situation indeed if the 
defendant's counsel by cross-examining a State's wit-
ness would open the case up to a host of corroborating 
w·itnesses who could follow the witness just cross-exam-
ined and testify that he had told them at a previous time 
the same story that he testified to in court. If this were 
the rule, defendant's counsel would not dare to cross-
examine a State's witness regarding any inconsistency in 
his testimony without running the risk of opening the 
case up to a host of witnesses offering heresay testimony 
under the guise of corroborating an impeached witness. 
In People vs. Doyel!, 48 Cal. 85, the Court said re-
garding this problem: 
''The witness cannot be confirmed by proof 
that he has given the same account before, for his 
mere declaration is not evidence. Ilis having given 
a different account, although not under oath, nec-
essarily impeaches either his veracity or his mem-
ory; but his having asserted the same thing does 
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not in general carry his credibility further than, 
nor so far as, his oath." 
In Chicago City Realty Co., vs. Matthieson, 212 Ill. 
292, 72 N.E. 443, the Court in analyzing this problem said: 
''If two statements are contradictory, they 
cannot both be true, and the fact that they were 
made tends to show that the witness is unreliable 
on account of an uncertain memory or want of 
truthfulness. It seems clear that such evidence 
could not be overcome or explained by proving 
that the witness at some other time made a state-
Jnent consistent trith his testimony. The witness is 
discredited by the fact that he has contradicted 
himself and related the transaction in different 
,,·ays, and to admit evidence that at some time he 
has made a statement consistent with his testi-
mony would only show that at different times he 
has been making different statements about the 
same matter.', (Italics supplied) 
EYen those poorly reasoned cases which permit the 
State to reha hili tate an impeached witness by offering an-
r•ther "·itness to testify that he told the same stor' to this 
. . 
\YitiH_)~s that he testified to under oath, would not permit 
such heresay testimon~· in a e-ase such as the one presented 
h.v this appt•aL "·here the "·itness \\as simply asked about 
prior inconsistent statements made under oath. It should 
l }(l nob ~d that the onlY inconsistencY that the witness But-
•' . 
ter~ ".<ls t)x~1miued in regard to ,,·as his testimony about 
11H) eo lor of 1 ht• uutoznobile, and yet the Court permitted 
()fliCl1 1' r~\,rrin to reeount \Yhat Butters had told him re-
gn rd i11g the f'ncts of the robbery, the description of the 
nlh\gPd robb<'I', nnd nn l'Yen more complete account of the 
i11('ideut than the \Yitness Butters himself offered to give. 
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:Jianifestly, if the testimony of Officer Ferrin was heresay 
and inadmissible, the admission of Officer Ferrin's pen-
ciled notes (Exhibit 1) was also error, and permitting the 
jury to examine and read the notes constituted a power-
ful heresay corroboration of the witness Butters' testi-
mony which was highly prejudicial to the defendant's 
case. 
The dangers of permitting such a thing are obvious. 
Investigating officers are professional witnesses, and or-
dinarily are impressive witnesses. At the trial of any 
criminal action, the jury is asked to pass upon the credi-
bility of the State's witnesses. If, thereafter the defend-
ant's counsel attacks the credibility of a State's witness 
on cross-examination, the rule contended for by the State 
\\I'"Ould permit the State to reinforce this testimony by ex-
perienced and impressive witnesses who could tell the 
jury the story of the crime just as the State's eyevvitness 
had told it to them. The jury might very well, having no 
knowledge of the rules of evidence, be far more impressed 
by the testimony of the police officers than they would be 
by the testimony of the eye,vitness and treat it as sub-
stantive evidence, and to permit this would open the dool' 
to all of the evils that the Heresay Rule was designed to 
prevent. The police officers could not be cross-examined, 
and their credibility could not be put on issue since they 
are only telling to the jury what one of the State's wit-
nesses told to them. 
The defendant submits that to permit Officer Ferrin, 
a po,verful professional "\vitness, to testify abo11t the facts 
that he had heard from the witness Butters, and to admit 
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his notes of such conversation in evidence, was highly 
prejudicial to the defendant's case, and the admission of 
this improper evidence was reversible error on the part 
of the trial judge. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S REFUSAL TO GRANT 
THE DEFENDANT PROBATION ON THE 
GROUND THAT HE WOULD NOT CONFESS 
HIS GUILT CONSTITUTES ERROR. 
Title 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides that: 
''Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any 
crime or offense, if it appears compatible with 
the public interest, the Court having jurisdiction 
may suspend the imposition or the execution of 
sentence, and may place the defendant on proba-
tion for such period of time as the Court shall 
determine.'' 
This statute contemplates that if it is compatible 
"·ith the public interest a defendant convicted of a crime 
may be placed on probation, and it -vests in the trial judge 
discretionary power to determine ''Thether or not it is 
compatible "·ith the public interest that the defendant be 
plaeed on probation. The exercise of a.ny such discretion 
must be based upon a sound and proper basis. The Court 
in this east' in sentencing the defendant Sibert refused the 
defPndnnt probation and based this refusal largely upon 
the faet. that thP defendant would not confess his guilt. 
Tht' Court said: 
4
' the judgment and sentence of the court is 
t.h:lt for the erime of robbery, of "·hich you were 
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convicted, you are sentenced to the indeterminate 
term as provided for by law, in the penitentiary of 
the State of Utah. Now, I can't grant you proba-
tion for several reasons, one of which, of course, 
is that you deny your guilt in this matter, and of 
course, we do not put defendants on probation as 
a rule where they do that, because there is no ref-
ormation to be made. They are not guilty in their 
own minds, so there is nothing that the Probation 
Department can do for them" (Tr. p. 114). 
If this reasoning of the Court's is sound, and is a 
valid basis for the exercising of the Court's discretion, 
then a defendant in a criminal action must decide after 
he is convicted whether to confess guilt to the Probation 
authorities, or face the denial of probation and be com-
mitted to the penitentiary. The defendant cannot bring a 
motion for a new trial, or appeal his conviction until after 
he has been sentenced, and yet under the theory of the 
trial court in this case, if he denies his guilt after a ver-
dict of conviction he cannot have probation. If he were 
to confess guilt in order to avoid losing his right to pro-
bation, and he was granted a new trial or his conviction 
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial, the offi-
cials of the Probation Department could appear as wit-
nesses against him. Thus the effect of the Court's rea-
soning in this case is to force the defendant to either tes-
tify against himself, or have probation denied him. Such 
a requirement would certainly violate the Fifth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States, and \vould 
be a deprivation of any defendant's rights. 
We must be realistic and recognize that many <ln in-
nocent man has been convicted by a jury, and to adopt a 
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rule that a man after having been convicted by a jury 
must confess guilt to the Probation authorities in order to 
be entitled to consideration for probation, places upon a 
defendant a burden that is unjust and repugnant to the 
western system of law. I have examined the authorities 
to find any case in western law that would support such 
a doctrine and I am unable to find any such authority. On 
the other hand, this philosophy is in harmony with east-
ern systems of law where it is considered entirely appro-
priate to require a confession before the defendant is 
granted any consideration for clemency by the court. 
This question, as far as I have been able to deter-
mine, has never before been presented to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah, or to any other appellate 
court in the United States, and is presented here in this 
appeal for the consideration of the Court without a cita-
tion of authorities, because this rule as announced by the 
trial court is without precedent so far as the appellant 
has been able to determine. 
This appellant respectfully contends that the trial 
judg-t .. in permitting the heresay testimony of Officer Fer-
rill, and i 11 pPrmitting the admission of his notes in eYi-
dencP, rommittt'd rPYersible and prejudicial error, and 
tha1 in dt .. nying the defendant probation because of his re-
fn~al to conft .. ss g-uilt, sho\\·t'}d that it based its exercise of 
diRcrt\iiou on an t"~rroneous legnl theory '\\7hich, if permit-
t.Pd to stand, "·ould require this defendant to testify 
10 
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against himself, and deny him the protection of the Con-
stitution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON I. HYDE 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
863 First Security Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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